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INTRODUCTION 
ver the years, the United States has taken a more expansive view 
regarding targeting objects, mostly with objects that have 
economic worth for the opposing side of the conflict. This Article 
focuses on taking the more expansive view of targeting objects and 
applying it to the targeting of civilians in relation to the changing 
circumstances of modern warfare. The United States should expand its 
definition of civilians who are Directly Participating in Hostilities 
(DPH) and therefore can be targeted. 
The specific focus of this Article is the way in which civilians 
interact with modern warfare, namely emerging technological 
weapons. New weapons that change the way war is carried out are 
being produced, thus creating a need to change the rules of war 
themselves. The civilians who interact with these weapons from the 
time they are designed until the time they are used in an armed conflict 
can be considered to be participating in hostilities. However, is the 
connection direct enough to make them direct participators in the 
hostilities, thus becoming targetable civilians? 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the 
United States have ways to determine if a civilian is DPHing. 
Currently, the ICRC considers people who initiate the use of the 
weapons and those who deliver weapons to the front lines as DPHing. 
The United States considers civilians who initiate and deliver to the 
front lines, and even some sellers and some manufacturers of the 
weapons, to be DPHing.  
This Article proposes that the United States’ view of DPHing should 
be expanded based upon the use of emerging technological weapons. 
The reasons for the proposed expansion begin with the fact that 
emerging technologies are often illegal on their face, whereas 
traditional weapons are not. Merely possessing many of the new 
emerging technological weapons is illegal. Also, there are often no 
O 
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other possible uses for these new technologies besides weaponization, 
and only specific individuals possess the technological know-how of 
these new technologies. It may be intimidating that more civilians 
could be targeted, but with the limiting principles explained in this 
Article, these fears can be mitigated. 
Part I of this Article explains the distinct views of the ICRC and the 
United States concerning DPH and explains the laws surrounding the 
targeting of objects. Part II combines the theory put forth by Ryan 
Goodman concerning the expansion of the targeting of objects and the 
theory of DPH expansion related to the emerging technologies. Part III 
analyzes how and why the emerging technologies should be treated 
differently with respect to civilians who come into contact with the 
emerging technologies. Finally, Part IV describes the limiting 
principles that are associated with DPH currently and my theory of the 
application of the limiting principles to DPHing related to emerging 
technological weapons.  
I 
BACKGROUND 
Civilians have the right to be protected from the dangers of war.1 
Civilians cannot be attacked or targeted during war, neither can they be 
used by the military against the opposing party.2 But what happens 
when civilians participate in the conflict? Because they are civilians, 
are they immune from any attack regardless of what actions they take? 
Article 51(3) of the Additional Protocol I (API) states that “civilians 
shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”3 The protection afforded 
to civilians does not last if the civilian directly participates in the 
hostilities.  
A. Direct Participation in Hostilities
These protections are stripped away when the civilian is found to be 
directly participating in hostilities. When civilians DPH, they forfeit 
the protections of being civilians, and as a result they can be the object 
1 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
[hereinafter API].  
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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of attack.4 While they are DPHing, civilians have no more protections 
under the laws of war than enemy combatants. Because of this, it is 
important to determine when civilians are DPHing.  
1. The ICRC’s View
Many countries follow the view of the ICRC, but the United States
does not. The ICRC has issued a guide titled “Interpretive Guidance on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law”5 that explains the ICRC’s position on DPH.  
The ICRC defines hostilities in treaty law as “situations of 
international or non-international conflict.”6 This does not refer to any 
conduct that happens outside of situations of conflict, including riots 
and isolated incidents of violence.7 “Participation” is defined as 
individual involvement in these hostilities.8 According to the ICRC, 
civilians can DPH and lose their protections based on their temporary 
activity.9 The civilians DPHing can be doing so on a “revolving door” 
basis, where one minute they are considered DPHing but the next 
minute they are not, and their protections are afforded back to them. If 
they make another decision to DPH, they lose those privileges again, 
over and over.10 
The ICRC uses a three-part test to determine the constitutive 
elements of DPH.11 The first part of this test is the “threshold of 
harm.”12 The threshold of harm is based upon a specific act of the 
civilian. That act must be likely to adversely affect military operations, 
or the act must be likely to inflict death, injury, or destruction against 
protected persons or objects.13 The harm does not have to ever manifest 
itself, it just must be likely that it would occur, based on the individual’s 
actions.14 
4 DEP’T OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, § 5.8 (2016) [hereinafter DOD MANUAL]. 
5 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (May 2009) 
(Prepared by Nils Melzer) [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance]. 
6 Id. at 41, n.75. 
7 Id. at 41. 
8 Id. at 43. 
9 Id. at 44. 
10 Id. at 70. 
11 Id. at 46. 
12 Id. at 47. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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The second part of the ICRC’s test is causation between the specific 
act and the harm that is likely to result.15 The “direct” participator in 
hostilities is referring to the “direct” causation of harm and the harm 
must be brought about in only one causal step.16 This means that the 
civilian’s specific action must directly affect the conflict. This does not 
mean that the civilian must be indispensable to the causation of harm, 
nor does it mean that the civilian has to be connected through an 
uninterrupted causal chain of events. It simply means that the specific 
action of the civilian directly affects the harm that is likely going to 
result.17 
The third and final step of the ICRC’s test is that there must be a 
“belligerent nexus.”18 A belligerent nexus means the “act must be 
specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of 
harm.”19 This is not something that depends on the mindset of the 
civilians performing the acts. It matters only what the act, objectively, 
was specifically designed to do.20 The only time civilians’ mindset 
matters is when they were either totally unaware of the role that they 
were playing, or when they have had their physical freedom taken 
away.21 
When these three parts of the ICRC’s test are combined, it reveals 
that for a civilian to be considered to be DPHing the civilian must have 
performed an act which was specifically designed to likely and directly 
cause harm to the opposing forces.22 
2. The United States’ View: Department of Defense Law of War
Manual
An alternative theory is provided by the Department of Defense Law
of War Manual (hereinafter Law of War Manual) that is followed by 
the United States.23 The United States has not adopted the Additional 
Protocol I (API) of the Geneva Convention, but it does support the 
15 Id. at 51. 
16 Id. at 53. 
17 Id. at 54. 
18 Id. at 58. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 59. 
22 Id. at 58. 
23 DOD MANUAL, supra note 4. 
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“customary principle on which Article 51(3) is based.”24 The Law of 
War Manual states that there are parts of the ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance that are consistent with the United States’ customary 
international law; however, there are significant parts that are 
inconsistent.25  
The United States’ view on DPH as written in the Law of War 
Manual is more permissive than the ICRC view. The Law of War 
Manual does not lay out a specific test that must be followed when 
determining if a civilian is DPHing. Rather, the Law of War Manual 
lays out relevant considerations that determine the status of a civilian, 
but makes clear that such determinations depend on the context of the 
conflict.26 
There are five relevant considerations listed in the Law of War 
Manual. The manual states that this is not an exhaustive list, thereby 
allowing for other considerations to be weighed if they are relevant.27 
The first consideration that the Law of War Manual deems relevant is 
the degree to which the act causes harm.28 Is this action a proximate 
cause or a “but for” cause? To what degree will this act likely adversely 
affect the military of the opposing party? What kind of harm will this 
act cause and how severe will it be?29 
The second consideration is the degree to which the act is connected 
to the hostilities.30 Is the act performed temporally or geographically 
close to the fighting? Is the act connected to a military operation?31 
The third consideration asks what are the specific purposes that 
underlay the act? What is the reason behind committing this certain 
act?32 
The fourth consideration is to what extent is there “military 
significance of the activity to the party’s war effort?” Does this act 
contribute to the military’s war effort? Does this act pose a significant 
threat to the opposing party?33 
24 Id. at 227. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 229. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 230. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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The final consideration is the degree to which the activity is “viewed 
inherently or traditionally as a military one.”34 Is this action 
traditionally performed by military forces?35 
As previously stated, there can be other considerations, as long as 
the party can prove the relevancy of the consideration. Determining if 
someone is DPHing is something that, in the United States’ view, is 
done on a case-by-case basis, following no specific formula for 
determination.36 The United States views civilians as DPHing not only 
when they are participating in actual combat but also when they are 
“engaging in combat . . . that effectively and substantially contributes 
to an adversary’s ability to conduct or sustain combat operations.”37 
The ICRC and the United States’ views differ when interpreting the 
Law of War Manual regarding the revolving door protection. The Law 
of War Manual states that DPHing civilians do not always regain their 
protection between instances of DPHing.38 If civilians are repetitiously 
in and out of DPHing, then they do not receive that protection.39 
Kenneth Watkin describes the idea of a “revolving door” by 
explaining, that the term “revolving door” evokes the idea of a form 
of carnival shooting gallery, where soldiers must wait until an 
opponent pops out from behind a door to be shot at. At some point, 
the credibility of the law begins to be undermined by suggesting an 
opponent can repeatedly avail themselves of such protection.40 
The United States sees the ICRC’s view of the revolving door 
protection as placing these people on better footing than the lawful 
combatants.41 The lawful combatants can be attacked at any time, 
whether or not they are participating in the hostilities at that moment. 
Yet, according to the ICRC, those DPHing can use the revolving door 
protection to their advantage and live their normal protected civilian 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 705 (2010). 
37 DOD MANUAL, supra note 4, at 228–29 (§ 5.8.3). 
38 Major Ryan T. Krebsbach, Totality of the Circumstances: The DoD Law of War 
Manual and the Evolving Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY 
L. & POL’Y 125, 149 (2017).
39 DOD MANUAL, supra note 4, at 235 (§ 5.8.4.2).
40 Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 689 
(2010). 
41 DOD MANUAL, supra note 4, at 236 (§ 5.8.4.2). 
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lives whenever they want, but they are able to attack and participate 
directly in the hostilities. 
B. Targeting
Warfare is constantly evolving. From ancient warfare, to 
gentlemen’s warfare, to guerilla warfare, to modern warfare, the way 
that wars are fought is always changing. Modern warfare is a new type 
of war everyone has to learn. Weapons are becoming more powerful 
and smaller. From behind their computers, individuals play a large part 
in cyberwarfare. Participants in armed conflicts are no longer only 
states but also non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. Modern 
warfare has caused the line between the military and the civilian 
population to blur.42 In order to effectively combat this modern 
development, the United States is taking a more expansive view of 
what is legally targetable. 
Targeting of an object is determined by an object’s location, use, 
purpose, or nature.43 An analysis done by Ryan Goodman, a professor 
at New York University, explained why the United States’ view of 
targeting objects should be expanded. Before discussing how his 
analysis relates to expanding the theory of DPH, it is important to give 
background to the theory of targeting objects. The targeting of objects 
is governed by Article 52 of the API. 
Article 52 has three parts. The first part states that civilian objects 
are not targetable.44 The second part of Article 52 reads as follows:  
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as 
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.45 
The third part of Article 52 states that if an object usually dedicated to 
civilian purposes is thought to be used to make an “effective 
contribution” to the military, there remains a presumption that it is not 
being used for military contributions and is therefore non-targetable.46 
42 Moving Targets: Ryan Goodman Examines How the Laws of Targeting Apply to the 
Modern Battlefield, N.Y.U. L. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ideas/ 
ryan-goodman-targeting-war-sustaining-objects. 
43 See generally id. 
44 API supra note 1, art. 52. 17512. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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To determine whether an object is targetable, the location, use, 
purpose, or nature of the object must (1) make an effective contribution 
to military action, and (2) offer a definite military advantage.47 If the 
object meets these criteria, the object may be targeted during armed 
conflict.48 
In his article, Targeting ‘War-Sustaining’ Objects in Non-
International Armed Conflict, Ryan Goodman raises the question, 
“Under what circumstances, if any, do objects such as revenue-
generating infrastructure of a non-State armed group qualify as military 
objectives?”49 In other words, how far does the term “military 
objective” reach? What is an object that “effectively contributes to 
military action?” 
For example, a number of people believe that both President George 
W. Bush and President Obama targeted the wrong kind of objects.50
During the conflict with ISIL, President Obama targeted the economic
infrastructure that was used to generate revenue for ISIL.51 Goodman
agrees with Presidents Bush and Obama that through customary law,
the United States can attack “war-sustaining” objects.52
In Goodman’s article, he explains that most states agree that any 
objects making direct contributions to an armed military action are 
targetable.53 However, there are also states that maintain that indirect 
contributions to an armed military action are targetable,54 but how 
broad can an “indirect contribution” be? 
The United States’ view on “indirect military contributions” is 
broken down into two types of targets: (1) “war-fighting” capabilities 
and (2) “war-sustaining” capabilities.55 Goodman defines “war-
fighting” capabilities as objects that are used to fight the war, including 
petroleum that is used to fuel military vehicles, as well as other energy 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Ryan Goodman, Targeting “War-Sustaining” Objects in Non-International Armed 
Conflict, 2 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 16–20, 2016). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 6. 
52 Id. at 1. 
53 Id. at 2. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
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resources that are used mainly for military consumption.56 Most states 
view “war-fighting” objects as targetable.57 
The second type of targets, those that are “war-sustaining,” are more 
controversial. The United States upholds the theory that “war-
sustaining” objects are targetable. The theory of “war-sustaining” 
capabilities was recognized by the United States as early as 1980 in the 
United States Air Force Manual.58 
“War-sustaining” objects are defined as those that help sustain the 
war effort, even if they do not directly contribute to the war effort.59 
This includes indirect economic support of the war. The Air Force 
Manual states, “It is permissible to attack economic targets that give 
only indirect support to enemy operations, so long as that support is 
effective and definite military advantage can be foreseen.”60 The 
standard required for “war-sustaining” is relatively low, although 
Goodman places a limiting factor on his theory of expansion by 
suggesting that only objects that are considered “great staples” can be 
targeted.61 According to Goodman, a “great staple” is “an export that 
was a crucial component of an enemy armed forces’ capabilities.”62 
The “great staple” of the opposing forces is the object that is targetable 
as a “war-sustaining” object.63  
The first time that the United States documented “war-sustaining” 
objects as targetable was in the United States Air Force Manual—
although the Manual does discuss a historic example from the 1870s.64 
During the Civil War, the Union justified destroying Confederate bales 
of cotton by arguing that the revenue generated from the sale of the 
cotton provided funds for Confederate arms and ammunition.65 This 
was legally justified by the international courts.66 
56 Id. at 2–3 (quoting INT’L COMM. RED CROSS [ICRC], Commentary of 1987 General 
Protection of Civilian Objects, art. 52, at 632, n.3.). 
57 Id. at 3. 
58 Id. at 4. 
59 Id. at 2–3. 
60 U.S. AIR FORCE, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
(Jul. 25, 1980). 
61 Goodman, supra note 49, at 18. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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Goodman understands the United States’ view on this topic to be 
that war-sustaining objects are a subset of military objectives and that 
they can include an “industry that generates revenue used to fund an 
enemy’s armed forces.”67 This view is supported by multiple 
authorities. First, the leading treatise on API, New Rules for Victims of 
Armed Conflicts, agrees that a “revenue-generating object can make an 
effective contribution to military action” and therefore can meet the 
definition of a military objective.68 Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) review of Article 52(2) supports a broad interpretation of war-
sustaining objects that includes “political and economic activities that 
support the enemy’s war effort.”69 
Finally, “war-sustaining” targeting is also supported through 
customary international law.70 Customary international law requires 
both state practice and opinio juris. State practice is the general practice 
of the states and has two components to it: (1) it must be widespread 
and representative, and (2) it must be the practice of the states that are 
actually affected.71 Opinio juris—the other requirement for customary 
international law—means that a state is generally recognized to be 
following a law because it thinks it has a legal obligation to do so.72 
With both state practice and opinio juris, a practice can be considered 
customary international law.  
There are three examples that Goodman discusses to support the 
theory that customary international law supports “war-sustaining” 
targeting. First, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom have all 
targeted petroleum in the conflict against ISIL, because ISIL receives 
so much revenue from oil.73 The second example is when NATO set 
their targets to military-industrial infrastructure and “other strategic 
targets.”74 NATO came out in support of attacking “not only an 
enemy’s war-fighting capability, but also his capacity to sustain the 
67 Id. at 6. 
68 Id. at 7–8; see also MICHAEL BOTHE, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 1949 (Karl Josef Partsch et al. eds., 1982). 
69 Goodman, supra note 49, at 9. 
70 Id. at 10. 
71 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), at 43. 
72 Id. at 45. 
73 Goodman, supra note 49, at 10. 
74 Id. at 13. 
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conflict.”75 And the third example is when electricity production 
facilities and oil refining and distribution facilities were targeted in the 
Persian Gulf by the Coalition since they provided “support for a 
nation’s war effort.”76 
Goodman argues that the reading of Article 52 has become broader 
and thus more capable of handling the intricacies of modern warfare by 
the expansion of targetable objects to include war-sustaining 
capabilities. 
II 
AN EXPANSIVE VIEW OF TARGETING CREATES AN EXPANSIVE 
VIEW OF DPH 
Goodman argues that targeting objects have become more expansive 
in order to meet the realities and the needs of modern warfare.77 This 
Part will discuss that targeting objects should not be the only thing that 
is expanded to meet this need. 
As Article 51 explains, civilians cannot be attacked or targeted 
unless they are directly participating in a conflict.78 As soon as they 
participate, civilians forfeit their protections and become targetable. 
The question then becomes: when are civilians acting as civilians and 
when are they acting as targets? 
All states generally agree that if a civilian is DPHing directly, then 
they are targetable. Direct DPHing includes a civilian taking up arms 
against the enemy, placing an IED, or setting a bomb.  
Goodman also discusses indirect contributions to the war effort. In 
light of Goodman’s justification for an expanded definition of what 
military objectives mean in modern conflicts, should the definition of 
DPH also be expanded? According to the ICRC, there is no way that 
civilians would be DPHing if they were not directly contributing to the 
war effort. The ICRC has a causation requirement that most likely 
would not be met by indirect contributions.79 
The United States analyzes this same issue by having a non-
exhaustive list of considerations, rather than specific requirements for 
a civilian to be considered DPH.80 Because this is a non-exhaustive list, 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 14. 
77 Id. at 19. 
78 API, supra note 1, art. 51.  
79 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 5, at 52–53. 
80 DOD MANUAL, supra note 4, at 228–31 (§ 5.8.3). 
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it can be argued that different types of indirect contributions by a 
civilian could be considered DPH.  
Modern warfare will be defined by the use of modern technologies. 
Among these are nano, chemical, and biological weapons. As these 
emerging technologies become weaponized, should the point at which 
a civilian is DPHing change from how it is treated under the current 
laws? 
A. Weapons with Emerging Technology
Throughout this Article, I will focus on weapons that involve future 
technologies. Before I go through a DPH analysis, however, I will 
provide a general overview of each of the emerging technologies that I 
will refer to throughout this Article. Each of the emerging technologies 
analyzed here have the ability to become weapons, changing the DPH 
analysis because they are less straightforward as the DPH analysis for 
a firearm or an IED. 
1. Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology is the understanding and control of matter that is
measured in nanometers, the equivalent of one-billionth of a meter.81 
The federal government defines nanotechnology as “science, 
technology, and engineering of things so small they are measured on a 
nanoscale.”82 A single nanometer is about ten times smaller than the 
width of a human DNA molecule.83 Nanotechnology includes 
manipulating these miniscule measurements of matter, causing 
different kinds of matter to react differently at that small a level.84 Some 
types of matter “exhibit unusual physical, chemical, and biological 
properties at the nanoscale.”85 
Nanotechnology has vastly contributed to innovations that help its 
user in wartimes. These inventions include clothing with a greater 
81 What It Is and How It Works, NANOTECHNOLOGY 101, https://www.nano.gov/ 
nanotech-101/what (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).  
82 Jeff Daniels, Mini-Nukes and Mosquito-Like Robot Weapons Being Primed for Future 
Warfare, CNBC (Mar. 17, 2017, 10:32 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/mini-
nukes-and-inspect-bot-weapons-being-primed-for-future-warfare.html.  
83 Id. 
84 What It Is and How It Works, supra note 81. 
85 Id. 
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tolerance for temperature changes, smaller cameras, and even 
augmentation of human performance.86 
There are several countries that are in different phases of 
weaponizing nanotechnology by using mini nuclear bombs.87 There are 
also small insect-like robots that can inject toxins into people or 
contaminate water supplies of large cities.88 These nanobots could be 
used as a delivery system for bioweapons.89 Del Monte, a scientist who 
deals in nanotechnology, predicts that terrorists could acquire 
nanoweapons on the black market as early as the late 2020s.90 Not only 
are these new technologies being invented but they are also becoming 
more accessible. 
2. Chemical Technology
Chemical technology is using chemicals and combinations of
chemicals to either help or hinder society. Many different chemical 
compounds can be made; unfortunately, many compounds are made 
with the intent of being used as a weapon. 
A chemical weapon is a manufactured chemical that is used to 
incapacitate, harm, or kill an individual.91 “A chemical weapon relies 
on the physiological effects of the chemical,” unlike chemical agents 
that are used only to “produce smoke or flame . . . or for riot control.”92 
Chemical weapons are popular because they are cheaper and easier to 
make than biological or nuclear weapons.93 These chemicals are placed 
in a delivery system such as a bomb. 
After a chemical weapon is released, the chemical must have contact 
with the skin or mucous membranes, be inhaled, or be ingested to cause 
86 Jacob Heller & Christine Peterson, Human Enhancement and Nanotechnology, 
FORESIGHT INSTITUTE, https://www.foresight.org/policy/brief2.html (last visited Mar. 30, 
2018); The Future of Nanotechnology and Computers So Small You Can Swallow Them, 
NPR (Nov. 23, 2015, 7:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/11/ 
23/457129179/the-future-of-nanotechnology-and-computers-so-small-you-can-swallow-
them; Will Soutter, Nanotechnology in Clothing, AZO NANO (Nov. 16, 2012), 
https://www.azonano.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=3129.  
87 Daniels, supra note 82. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Anne Marie Helmenstine, Chemical Weapons and Warfare Agents: What You Need 
to Know, THOUGHTCO. (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/chemical-weapons-
and-warfare-agents-602015.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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its desired effect.94 There are four types of chemical weapons: choking 
agents (chlorine), blistering agents (mustard), blood agents (hydrogen 
cyanide), or nerve agents (sarin). Each of these weapons has the ability 
to injure or kill the victim depending on the amount of chemical the 
individual comes into contact with. 
Chemical weapons were first outlawed in 1925 as part of the Geneva 
Protocol.95 The Protocol banned asphyxiating and poisonous gases, as 
well as bacteriological weapons.96 Negotiations between nations began 
building upon this foundation. In 1980, a multilateral treaty was created 
to outlaw the use and possession of chemical weapons. This treaty was 
known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and was entered 
into force on April 19, 1997.97 The treaty currently has 192 state parties, 
with only three states that have neither signed nor ratified the 
convention.98 The CWC is implemented by the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is headquartered at 
the Hague.99  
The CWC bans chemical weapons and requires that all chemical 
weapons be destroyed within a given period of time.100 The CWC 
specifically prohibits the development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons.101 One of 
the ways the OPCW enforces this treaty is through routine inspections 
and challenge inspections.102 Depending on the gravity of the violation, 
if a state violates the treaty, the issue could come up before the United 
Nation’s Security Council and General Assembly.103 
Syria ratified the CWC in 2013, stating that it would observe the 
requirements of the CWC immediately, instead of waiting the thirty 
94 Id. 
95 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (June 
22, 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance [hereinafter ARMS CONTROL 
ASS’N].  
96 Chemical and Biological Weapons, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Apr. 8, 
2013), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/chemical-biological-weapons. 
97 ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, supra note 95. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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days required by the treaty.104 In the summer of 2013, there were over 
1000 civilians killed outside Damascus by the Syrian military in a 
chemical weapons attack that allegedly included sarin.105 Since 2013, 
there have been at least six chemical weapons attacks by the Syrian 
military.106 Despite ratifying the CWC, Bashar al-Assad’s regime 
continues to use chemical weapons against civilians. It is still unknown 
if several other states have destroyed their stockpile of chemical 
weapons.107 The numerous uncertainties mean that the problem of 
chemical warfare is still a prominent concern to the safety of the world. 
3. Biotechnology
Biotechnology is technology that is based upon the biomolecular
process in living organisms.108 Different types of biotechnology are 
created by genetically modifying cells in order to produce the desired 
molecule.109  
Biotechnology can use human cells to help combat diseases. When 
plant and animal cells are used, biotechnology helps to feed the hungry, 
and it can also help with using less and cleaner energy. Medications 
and antibiotics are made through biotechnology, but biotechnology can 
also be used as a weapon. Biotechnology can be used for the intentional 
infliction of disease and the creation of new viruses with the intent of 
spreading the disease in order to infect as many people as possible.  
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force on 
March 26, 1975. Similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
BWC bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological 
weapons.110 
104 Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and State Parties, ARMS CONTROL 
ASS’N (updated Jan. 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig. 
105 Assaf Orion, The United States, Syria, and Chemical Weapons: An Unfinished 
Symphony, INSS (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-united-states-syria-
and-chemical-weapons-an-unfinished-symphony/.  
106 Krishnadev Calamur, Assad Is Still Using Chemical Weapons in Syria, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/syria-
chemical-weapons/552428/.  
107 These states include Iraq and Syria, plus the three states that never signed onto the 
CWC. 
108 What Is Biotechnology?, AMGEN, http://www.biotechnology.amgen.com/ 
biotechnology-explained.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
109 Id. 
110 The Biological Weapons Convention, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT 
AFFAIRS, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).  
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B. The Emergence of Technological Weapons Should Promote an
Expanding View of DPH
Modern warfare is a completely new and ever-changing type of
warfare. Nano, bio, and chemical weapons are only a handful of the 
new types of weapons systems. These weapons create a more indirect 
type of warfare that has the potential to affect more people. Following 
the traditional view of DPH would severely limit the fighting 
capabilities of states adhering to the laws of armed conflict. The 
civilians directly participating in the hostilities have the option to be 
more indirectly involved than ever before and often would not qualify 
as DPHing under the traditional view, even though they are 
contributing immensely to the war effort. With the new technological 
advances, civilians can do so much more of the killing, and it is 
important that they, too, can be targeted in an evolving manner. 
III 
CIVILIANS DPH WHILE INTERACTING WITH EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
Goodman explained in his article why he believes that the 
requirements for targeting objects should be expanded. Similarly, I will 
explain how and why the requirements to consider a civilian to be 
DPHing should also be expanded.  
A. Initiator
The initiator, or the last person that the weapon comes into contact 
with before being set into motion, is considered to be DPHing by both 
the ICRC and the United States. This type of DPH is undisputed. If 
there is a firefight and there are civilians caught in the middle and one 
of the civilians picks up a firearm and joins in the fight, that civilian is 
suddenly considered to be directly participating in the hostilities, and 
therefore become a legal target for the opposing side.  
The view of the ICRC contains the three requirements to be 
considered DPH. The initiator of a weapon fulfills all three. The first is 
the threshold of harm. Releasing an emerging technological weapon is 
very likely going to be harmful, often times more so than a traditional 
weapon because many emerging technological weapons can injure or 
kill hundreds or thousands of people at a time. Secondly, there also has 
to be direct causation between the act and the harm. That is exactly 
what we have with initiators because such individuals know that they 
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are the last step between the action and the harm. They are the ones 
releasing these weapons into the armed conflict. Third, there must be a 
belligerent nexus, or it must be specifically designed to injure or kill. 
Modern technology is not only designed to injure or kill but often is 
designed to injure or kill as many people at once as possible. The 
ICRC’s view of initiators is clear: they are DPH. 
The United States’ view of DPH has a combination of factors, but it 
is not an exhaustive list. Being the initiator, the act of initiating the 
weapon will cause harm. It is clearly directly connected to the 
hostilities, because initiators are releasing these weapons in the middle 
of the armed conflict. Another consideration is the purpose behind the 
act. When an individual releases an emerging technological weapon in 
an armed conflict, the purpose is usually to injure or kill. The release 
of a chemical, biological, or nanoweapon will likely contribute to the 
military by helping them take over their enemy by force or surrender. 
Finally, releasing emerging technological weapons is traditionally a 
military action. Clearly, initiating a weapon is considered DPH 
according to the United States. 
There is no differentiation between the way that initiators are treated 
when using old technology and how they should be treated when using 
emerging technology. The individual who uses the biological weapon, 
the individual who puts the nanoweapon into action, and the person 
who releases a chemical weapon are all considered to be DPHing—just 
the same as someone who picks up a firearm or places an IED in a 
firefight.  
B. Deliverer
The individual who delivers the weapon to the front lines is 
considered to be DPHing by both the ICRC and the United States.  
The ICRC makes the distinction between the individual who delivers 
the weapon to the front lines and the person who delivers the weapon 
to the logistics base.111 The ICRC determines what is too far away from 
the front lines by considering what is in the causal, temporal, and 
geographical proximity to the resulting harm.112 The Law of War 
Manual has a similar test, but the individuals who are considered to be 
DPHing while transporting weapons must be in close geographic and 
temporal proximity to using the weapons.113  
111 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 5, at 55–56. 
112 Id. 
113 DOD MANUAL, supra note 4, at 230 (§ 5.8.3). 
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The ICRC would consider these individuals to be DPHing because 
they would meet each of the three requirements set out by the ICRC. 
The individual who is delivering the weapons usually understands that 
the threshold of harm is very likely. These weapons can often destroy 
cities and can kill thousands of people. It is the act of delivering the 
weapons that allows for these deaths and injuries to happen. There is a 
direct causal link between delivering a weapon and that weapon, in 
turn, creating injury and death. It is a direct link because, without this 
act, the weapon cannot be on the front lines and cannot be released. The 
act of delivering the weapon is designed to cause the harm. There is no 
other reason for delivering a technological weapon to the front lines of 
a war, other than for that weapon to be used intentionally to cause 
death. 
The United States would view the deliverer of weapons to the front 
lines to be DPHing based on the five considerations laid out in the Law 
of War Manual. The act of delivering the weapon itself does not cause 
harm, but it is clearly connected to the hostilities. It is likely that when 
an individual delivers a weapon to the front lines, that individual is 
doing it for the purposes of furthering the war effort and to destroy or 
harm the enemy. A weapon inherently has military significance 
because it contributes to the war effort. Without weapons, a war could 
not be fought. It is unclear whether it is typically the military that 
delivers the weapons to the front, but regardless, it is clear that the 
individuals who deliver the weapons to the front lines are DPHing and 
can be targeted while they are delivering that weapon. 
There is no real distinction between the way that civilians should be 
treated when delivering old technological weapons and delivering 
emerging technological weapons to the front lines. Even the 
technological know-how of the emerging technology does not play a 
role when delivering weapons.  
However, the difference lies with how far removed the deliverer of 
emerging technologies can be and still be considered DPHing. I believe 
that when delivering emerging technological weapons, the deliverers 
should be considered to be DPHing in further proximity than where the 
ICRC or the United States currently stands. Unlike old weapons, where 
the weapons themselves are not illegal, emerging technological 
weapons are often illegal on their face. Older weapons are not only 
inherently legal but there are often other purposes for possessing them. 
For example, a firearm is not inherently illegal. It can also be used for 
self-defense or for hunting food. New technological weapons are often 
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illegal, including chemical and bio weapons. New technology does not 
usually have other purposes accompanied with it. They are weapons 
used to cause hurt, pain, destruction, and fatality. Because of this, when 
civilians are delivering emerging technological weapons, and they have 
knowledge of what they are delivering, they should be considered 
DPHing, no matter how far removed from the front lines they may be. 
C. Seller
What if we go one step further and analyze the seller of the emerging 
technological weapon? This individual is typically more removed from 
the situation than the other two individuals who have been discussed: 
the initiator and the deliverer. The seller may or may not know who is 
actually buying the weapons. The ICRC and the U.S. Department of 
Defense have a different viewpoint on whether the seller is DPHing.  
According to the ICRC’s view, the seller is not DPHing and cannot 
be a targeted civilian. The chemical, biological material, or nanotech 
may or may not be in weaponized form; therefore, it is uncertain that 
selling it will cause harm. Selling this material would only “maintain 
the capacity of a party to harm its adversary.”114 Therefore, under the 
ICRC, the seller’s action can only be indirect causation because it does 
not cause the injury or death in one causal step. Even if this was not the 
case, it would have to be proven that there was a belligerent nexus or 
that the seller was selling the material in order to cause injury or harm. 
In the United States, where there has already been an expansion of 
targeting objects, the expansion would carry over into targeting people 
who were DPHing. The seller would cause no harm because by selling 
the material harm is not being caused—that comes further down the 
line. The selling of the material could or could not be connected to the 
hostilities, but it would be hard to prove. The seller’s specific purpose 
is hard to prove in the act of selling. Generally, things are sold to make 
a profit, so it would be hard to prove that a seller had another reason 
for selling the material. On the other hand, selling this material may 
pose a threat to the opposing party even though there is no military 
significance to what is being done. When a seller is selling biological 
or chemical material, there is a very good chance that the seller would 
know if it was weaponized or not, depending on the amounts and the 
compounds that are being used. The circumstances with nanotech are 
not as clear, but it is pretty obvious that some nanotech, like nanobots, 
are being sold to be used in an armed conflict.  
114 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 5, at 53. 
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The seller likely knows that the emerging technology is going into 
the hands of combatants. This is where a new consideration should be 
added and given weight: the likelihood that the seller knows the 
emerging technology is going into the hands of combatants. In this 
case, if the seller likely knows the emerging technology is going 
directly into the hands of combatants, then under the United States’ 
view the seller is DPHing. However, if it is only indirectly going into 
the hands of combatants, then the seller is not DPHing. Under this 
analysis, the United States’ view would find that a seller could in fact 
be DPHing and targetable.  
The difference between the seller of old technological weapons and 
the seller of emerging technological weapons is that there is no 
legitimate seller of some of these emerging weapons, because 
biological weapons and chemical weapons are both illegal on their 
faces. No one can legally sell an illegal product. One can be charged 
merely with drug possession and dealing just because the product is 
inherently illegal. It does not matter if you use the drugs; it is illegal 
merely to have and sell them. With weapons that are inherently illegal, 
including chemical and bio weapons, it should not matter if you use 
them, only if you are in possession and sell them.  
Some emerging technology (for example, nanotech) is not inherently 
illegal. However, the sellers of emerging technological weapons should 
also be considered to be DPHing because of the technological know-
how that it takes to use these new weapons. Emerging technological 
weapons are not as simple as “point and shoot.” One must know how 
to use them. An average person can shoot a gun but cannot use nanotech 
or chemical weapons without some technological know-how. As a 
result of the required technological knowledge, the seller should 
reasonably know that the buyer can most likely use the technology or 
get it to someone who can and whose knowledge may allow the 
technology to be used to destroy. It is reasonable to assume the seller 
understands this, and thus the seller should be considered to be 
DPHing. 
D. Manufacturer
As we continue further back along the chain of production of these 
emerging technological weapons, we get to the manufacturer. The 
individuals or companies that manufacture the weapons may be 
considered DPHing, according to the view of the United States.  
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If the ICRC does not view the seller as DPHing, then it is highly 
unlikely that someone even further back on the chain of events could 
be considered to be DPHing. The manufacturers of these technologies 
are not going to pass the threshold of harm test. There could be no direct 
causation linked back to the manufacturer from the harm that is caused 
to individuals during war. It could be hard to prove that the reason that 
these materials are being manufactured is to cause harm. Therefore, 
under the ICRC view, the manufacturer is not DPHing and cannot be 
targeted.  
According to the United States’ view, there is an argument to be 
made for finding the manufacturer to be DPHing in some instances. 
The act of making a chemical, creating biological material, or building 
a nanobot is not an act that inherently causes harm. There should be a 
consideration at this point as to how likely it is that the manufacturer 
knows that it can cause harm and how likely it is that the chemical, 
biological material, or nanobot will cause harm. Manufacturing these 
technologies is not necessarily connected to hostilities, which makes 
these new technological weapons harder to deal with than normal 
weapons. Another consideration should be why the manufacturers are 
making these weapons—what is their motivation behind doing so? If it 
is to help the war effort or to sell to the combatants, these individuals 
should be considered DPHing and therefore can be targeted because 
the creation of such weaponized technology is significant to the 
military. 
The difference between the manufacturer of old technological 
weapons and the manufacturer of emerging technological weapons is 
similar to the analysis for the seller of emerging technological weapons. 
With older, more traditional weapons, normal factory workers were not 
targetable under either the ICRC or the United States’ view. The 
product itself was not illegal, even though there could be potential 
intention to use it as a weapon. The difference, again, is that there are 
emerging technological weapons that are inherently illegal. It is clearly 
illegal to manufacture an illegal product. Chemical weapons and 
biological weapons both fall into this category. There is also a know-
how aspect to these manufacturers: they have considerable knowledge 
in order to create these emerging technologies, and often they are the 
only reason the weapons are created; therefore, the manufacturers 
should be considered DPHing. For the technologies that are not illegal 
on their faces, the intention of manufacturing for use as a weapon must 
be proven in order for the manufacturers to be considered DPHing. 
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Overall, the manufacturers of new emerging technologies should be 
viewed as DPHing. 
E. Designer
The designer or the inventor of old technological weapons is not 
considered DPHing under the views of the ICRC or the United States. 
The theory is that the person who invents new technologies should not 
be the one responsible for the damage caused due to other people’s 
actions. 
Under the ICRC, these designers and inventors are clearly not DPH 
because their acts create no harm and there is no causal link between 
the invention and the possible injury or death. Even if they do have the 
intent to hurt or kill people with their ideas, they are too removed to 
make them legal targets under the ICRC’s theory of DPH. 
Under the United States’ view, it would be nearly impossible to 
prove that these individuals should be considered DPH. There is no 
harm caused by what they are doing. If these individuals were 
considered DPH, then it would greatly hinder technological 
advancements because anything can be used for an evil purpose; as a 
result, people would be afraid to invent because it would then cause 
them to be targets. Before anything has even been done to create these 
materials, or even if these materials have been sold to people who use 
them to create injury or harm, there is no way to connect the designer 
of the technological advances to the hostilities. Therefore, the United 
States’ view is that the individuals who design what may later become 
technological weapons are not DPHing. 
I argue that, generally, DPH should extend as far back as the 
designer. Nanotech, for example, is not generally illegal, but the 
designer should be considered DPH when the only way that the weapon 
can be completed is by the work the designer does. Another example is 
the scientist who creates a genetic virus that is tied to an individual’s 
DNA. Without this scientist, the weapon is never made, and the genetic 
virus has no other possible use than as a weapon. Also, if the designer 
is designing an inherently illegal weapon or product, even if it is not 
weaponized, the designer should be considered DPHing because the 
designer still intends to design an illegal product. Under this 
circumstance, the designer should be considered to be DPHing and thus 
targetable. 
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F. Under the United States’ View, DPH Is More Expansive in Light
of Technological Weapons 
The United States’ definition of DPH extends further than the 
definition provided by the ICRC, giving a natural basis to extend DPH 
in the United States to emerging technologies. Based on the theories in 
Goodman’s article, where targeting is more expansive, DPH should be 
more expansive when implementing emerging technological weapons. 
The factors used by the Department of Defense, combined with the 
technological know-how required for emerging technologies, and the 
fact that biological and chemical weapons are facially illegal, DPH 
should extend to the manufacturer, and in some cases, even as far back 
as the designer.  
IV 
MITIGATING CONCERNS 
There are some concerns that the proposed theory of broadening the 
view of individuals who are DPH will create an overly expansive view. 
There may be worries about what type of people can become targets 
based on DPHing, and people may be worried that some innocent act 
could be mistaken as DPHing. This Part will mitigate such concerns. 
I briefly touch on a few of the limiting principles that both Article 
52 and Goodman give weight to. Article 52 and Goodman’s limiting 
principles do not apply directly or differently to new technology, but 
instead can help provide a framework for generally applicable limiting 
principles.  
A. Article 52 Limiting Principles
Article 52(2) states that there must be a “definite military advantage” 
in order to consider an individual DPH.115 The destruction that is 
caused by the targeted object must not only cause harm but must create 
a “definite military advantage.” This provides a constraint to the 
expanding view of targeting; it is one more hurdle that must be passed 
in order to target an object.116 If harm is caused but that harm does not 
provide a definite military advantage, then it is illegal to target it.  
Another principle expressed in Article 52 is the proportionality 
argument.117 This principle says that there has to be a proportionality 
115 API, supra note 1, art. 52(2). 
116 Goodman, supra note 49, at 17. 
117 API, supra note 1, arts. 52(2), 57. 
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analysis involved with each object that is targeted. By targeting the 
specific object, how many civilians die and how much damage is done 
to civilian objects? Does that harm outweigh the military advantage?118 
If it does, then it is not protected. 
B. Goodman’s View of Limiting Principles
In Goodman’s article, he addresses limiting principles that can 
mitigate concerns that individuals have over expanding the view of 
targeting to include war-sustaining objects.119  
The example that Goodman uses is “if a source of economic support 
to a military can be easily substituted by another source,” then it is 
speculative, and it cannot be targeted because it does not constitute a 
“definite military advantage.”120 
Another limiting principle that Goodman uses is what he calls the 
“great staple.”121 To legally target an economic source, it must be an 
“indispensable and principle source” for that State or group.122 
Goodman references examples to build this point—the Confederacy 
had cotton, the Taliban had narcotics, and ISIL had petroleum as its 
“great staple.”123 The requirement that the economic source be 
indispensable and principle prevents any and every economic source 
from being targeted.  
These limiting principles do not allow “free reign” when it comes to 
allowing just any object to be targeted. They create an environment 
where it is hard to excessively expand targetable objects. 
C. Mitigating Concerns That the DPH Analysis Could Become
Too Broad 
There are valid concerns with expanding DPH all the way to the 
designer of new technological weapons. Central is the concern that the 
proposed DPH definition is too expansive and there could be too many 
civilians considered DPHing and therefore targetable. I present three 
118 Goodman, supra note 49, at 18–19. 
119  Id. at 16. 
120 Id. “Definite military advantage” refers to the limiting principle put forth in Article 
52. 
121 Id. at 18. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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limiting principles that curtail these concerns and are specifically 
designed to apply to new technological weapons. 
1. “For Such Time” Language
Article 51 states that “civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded
by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.”124 This is language that was briefly analyzed in the above 
DPH analysis under the “revolving door” policy, but the language plays 
a larger role in who can be considered DPH. 
Civilians who are manufacturing, selling, delivering, or instigating 
the weapons—under a certain set of circumstances—can all be 
considered DPH, but only for such time as they are actually engaged in 
the act. Individuals who sell a weapon to a militant group are targetable 
for the time they are in the process of selling the weapon. However, 
once that weapon is out of their hands, they are not DPHing anymore 
and cannot be targeted. Civilians who deliver a weapon to the front 
lines are DPHing during the time that they have the weapon. Once they 
make their delivery, they are not DPHing anymore. 
The difference that emerging technologies make in this analysis is 
that the “for such time” language should extend slightly longer with 
respect to emerging technologies. Individuals who spend time dealing 
with these emerging technologies are in possession of illegal weapons, 
and whether they use them or not, they are still illegal. So, for the entire 
time that these weapons are with them, those individuals should be 
targetable. Essentially, “for such time” that civilians are in possession 
of and have access to these emerging technologies or weapons, they 
should be considered to be DPHing.  
2. Mens Rea
Criminal law requires two things to make an act a crime: mens rea
and actus reus. Essentially, the actus reus of the crime is the physical 
act, and the mens rea is the mindset of an individual when committing 
a crime. Different crimes have different mens rea requirements. An 
individual does not get convicted for aggravated murder simply for 
killing someone, the actus reus of the crime. The individual must also 
have “intentionally or knowingly” caused the death of another.125 
I propose applying such a mens rea requirement to the DPHers as 
well. If there is a mens rea required, it will likely limit the people who 
124 API, supra note 1, art. 51(3). 
125 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202(1) (Westlaw 2012). 
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are considered DPH. If those who are selling an emerging technological 
weapon have no idea what they are selling, then they should not be held 
accountable for promoting the war effort. There should be factors 
identified to determine the likelihood of their knowledge and if they are 
intentionally contributing to the war. One factor for sellers of emerging 
technological weapons could be if the sale is taking place through 
regular channels or on the black market. Similarly, it should be 
determined that the deliverers have knowledge of what they are 
delivering.  
Having a mens rea requirement would allow people who were not 
actually contributing to the war effort to not be considered DPH, while 
those helping and promoting the war effort would be targetable. I 
propose that mens rea should be a factor for both old weapons and new 
weapons; however, I believe mens rea would be easier to prove 
regarding new weapons, because so many are inherently illegal and any 
nanotech that is weaponized is generally easy to identify as such. 
3. Proportionality
An additional limiting factor is proportionality. By instituting a
proportionality analysis, the expansion of the DPH theory can be 
limited and prevent the unfair targeting of civilians. The proportionality 
analysis would remain the same as that used for old weapons. 
Considering that many of these new technologies do not result in direct 
killings but instead present slower ways to injure or kill, such as 
infecting the water, the proportionality analysis is even more needed in 
these situations.  
The proportionality analysis asks one simple question: would 
targeting and killing this individual who is DPHing give your military 
an advantage that would be greater than allowing the individual 
DPHing to run free? If this question could be answered in the 
affirmative, then that individual should be targeted.  
CONCLUSION 
Due to emerging technological weapons, the United States should 
expand its definition of civilians who are DPHing and can therefore be 
targeted under the rules of war. 
Civilians are involved in DPH at all different levels of the war, as 
evidenced by the analysis provided in this Article. Regarding 
technological weapons, the initiator, the deliverer, the seller, the 
manufacturer, and the designer should all be considered DPHing for 
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the time that they are performing those acts. It is important that there 
be stricter rules with emerging technological weapons because these 
weapons are facially illegal or require specific know-how that the 
average person does not have. If a civilian possesses an illegal weapon, 
it does not matter what is being done with it: it is still illegal. Therefore, 
that civilian should be considered to be without the protections from 
war and targetable.  
However, such civilians can only be targeted if they have faced, and 
passed, the proportionality analysis as well as the other limiting 
principles. The limiting principles include general principles from 
Article 52 and from Goodman’s article, as well as new limiting 
principles designed specifically for emerging technological weapons, 
including “for such time” language and a mens rea requirement.  
This expansive view should not be considered a way to injure or kill 
more civilians but as a way to stop the opposing side in an age of 
modern warfare where emerging technological weapons are being 
used.  
